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Hennig and Olson: The Colorado River Salinity Problem - Old Approaches to a New Iss

THE COLORADO RIVER SALINITY PROBLEMOLD APPROACHES TO A NEW ISSUE*
The Colorado River has historically had salinity concentrations higher than most other major rivers. The salinity
level-the concentration of dissolved solids in the water'generally increases as the river wends southward along its
1,400 mile course from its headwaters in the Rocky Mountains to the Gulf of California. Two processes account for
this increase-salt loading and salt concentrating. Salt
loading occurs when additional solids are added to the river,
while salt concentrating results when water is removed so
that the same amount of salts are suspended in a lesser
quantity of water. These processes occur both naturally and
as a result of man's activities 2
The climate of the Colorado River Basin is arid. As a
result, there has not been the precipitation over time to leach
the salts from the characteristically saline soils of the region.
Thus, when land is put under cultivation and irrigated, these
salts are picked up from the soil and added to the river in
return flows. This process, known as salt loading, also occurs
naturally as the water washes salts from the beds and banks
of the river and its tributaries. Natural point sources, mainly saline springs, contribute additional salts to the river.
Salt concentrating, the process whereby water is removed
and salts are left behind, results from evaporation and transpiration and from man's depletions and consumptive uses
of river water. Transbasin diversions in the Upper Basin,
for example, remove pristine water that would otherwise
dilute the more saline waters of the lower reaches of the river.
0
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2.

of The University of Wyoming.
Two measures of this concentration of dissolved solids are milligrams per
liter (mg/1) and parts per million (ppm). The units of measurement are
nearly equivalent up to concentrations of 7000 mg/1. See FLACK & HOWE,
SALINITY IN WATER RESOURCES 28 n.1 (1974).
For a more detailed discussion, see, e.g., COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY
CONTROL FORUM, PROPOSED WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR SALINITY INCLUDING NUMERIC CRITERIA AND PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR SALINITY

CONTROL-CoLORADO RIVER SYSTEM 11 (June 1975)

(hereinafter cited as

FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
QUALITY OF WATER-COLORADO RIVER BASIN 36 (Progress Report No. 7,
Jan. 1975) (hereinafter cited as INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No. 7).
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The overall level of salinity in the Colorado River has
been increasing each year, largely as a result of man's activities in the basin. One estimate, for example, indicates that
salinity at Imperial Dam tripled during the 50-year period
ending in 1965,' and that the projected level for the year
2010 could be 50 percent higher than the 1965 level.' This
projected level would pose a high hazard, according to Department of Agriculture standards, to irrigated crops.'
While natural diffuse and point sources contribute roughly
half of the salinity, irrigated agriculture is the principal
source of man-caused salinity, accounting for approximately
37 percent of the total.'
Salinity usually begins to create problems for water
users when the level of concentration exceeds 1,000 miligrams
per liter (mg/i).' However, in that salinity per se does not
pose hazards to human health, except in extreme concentrations, the problems created by salinity are chiefly economic,' and may include, for example, decreased crop yields
on irrigated lands, increased treatment costs for municipal
and industrial users, pipe corrosion, and decreased potability
of drinking water.' In the ecological realm, increased salinity
levels may adversely affect fish, wildlife, and natural vegetation." In terms of dollars, it has been suggested that each
one part per million increase in salinity imposes $230,000 in
additional costs and damages on downstream agricultural,
industrial and municipal users. 1 The total cost to users in
the basin is currently estimated at $16,000,000 annually and
3. Gardner & Stewart, Agriculture and Salinity Control in the Colorado River
Basin, 15 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 63, 65 (1975).
4. Id. at 66.
5. Id. at 64, citing U.S. SALINITY LABORATORY, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
DIAGNOSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF SALINE AND ALKALI SOILS 69-8Z (USDA
Agriculture Handbook No. 60, Feb. 1954).
6. Evans, Salt Problem in the Colorado River, 15 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 55,
56 (1975), citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

(1972);

FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY,

at 13.
7. FLACK & HOWE, supra note 1, at 13.
8. Id.
9. Id., citing U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM IN THE COLORADO RrVER BASIN (1971).

10. INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No. '7, at 70.
11. Evans, supra note 6, at 56, citing COLORADO RIVER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
PROGRAM.
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is projected at $51,000,000 for the year 2010.12 Roughly 80
percent of these costs is to irrigated agriculture."
A major portion of the salinity problem on the Colorado
River is thus one of upstream irrigators imposing costs
on downstream irrigators. The river is used to irrigate
1,600,000 acres in the Upper Basin and roughly 800,000
acres in the Lower Basin;" in addition, 425,000 acres are
irrigated from the river in Mexico. 5 In qualitative terms,
however, utilization of Colorado River water for irrigation
in the Lower Basin yields a gross crop income of about
$400 per acre, 6 while the Upper Basin yield per acre is
probably less than $100." Across the international border,
the irrigated agriculture industry supported by the river is
of major import not only to the economy of the Mexicali
Valley but also to the overall national economy of Mexico."
In 1961 the salinity problem of the Colorado River came
to the forefront when the salinity of water being delivered
to Mexico was more than tripled as a result of the completion
of a drainage canal constructed to dispose of briny subterranean water from the Yuma Mesa and Welton-Mohawk
irrigation districts. 9 The principal source of this highly
saline water has been traced to approximately 56 farms,
consisting of roughly 27,000 acres within the two districts."
For a variety of political and economic reasons, 2 ' the Mexican response was swift and vehement.22 Interim measures
12. Id.
13. Gardner & Stewart, supra note 3, at 66.
14. INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No. 7, at 15.
15.

FORUM PPOPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, at

11.

16. INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No. 7, at 23.
17. Mann, Conflict and Coalition: Political Variables Underlying Water Resource Development in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 15 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 141, 161 (1975).

18. Furnish & Ladman, The Colorado River Salinity Agreement of 1973 and
the Mexicali Valley, 15 NATURAL

RESOURCES J.

83,

90

(1975);

Salgado,

Principal Economic Aspects of the Problem of Salinity of the Colorado
River, 15 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 129, 130 (1975).
19.

HUNDLEY, DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY BETWEN
THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 172-73 (1966); Furnish & Ladman, supra

note 18, at 89.
20. Martin, Economic Magnitudes and Economic Alternatives in Lower Basin
21.

Use of Colorado River Water, 15 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 229, 231 (1975).
HUNDLEY, supra note 19.

22. Id. at 173-76.
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were eventually taken and temporary agreements negotiated.23 Ultimately, a "permanent and definitive" solution
was negotiated and signed by the two governments in 1973,24
with the needed federal implementing legislation being enacted by the United States Congress the following year.2
While the salinity issue was first raised with respect
to Mexico, it has become increasingly clear in recent years
that salinity has become a problem for American water users
Thus, salinity
on the lower reaches of the river as well.
control now has a dual significance-first, a basin-wide
control program is necessary if the United States is going
to be able to comply with the agreement recently negotiated
with Mexico; second, control is essential if American water
users in the Lower Basin are going to avoid damages similar
to those suffered by their neighbors in Mexico during the
early 1960's. At present, salinity control efforts above Imperial Dam are being marshalled under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the Environmental Protection Agency. 8
This Comment briefly surveys present and planned
salinity control programs on the Colorado River with a view
to identifying whether or not past patterns of policymaking
and problem-solving evidenced with respect to development
and allocation of the river are being carried over into the
attempted management of the salinity problem. Emphasis
is placed on identifying implications which may flow from
the manner in which the salinity problem is being addressed,
particularly in the area of federal-state relations.
23.

24.
25.
26.

27.
28.

Minute No. 218, March 22, 1965, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2478, T.I.A.S. No. 6988.
See text accompanying notes 38 to 40, infra. Minute No. 241, July 14,
1972, [1972] 2 U.S.T. 1286, T.I.A.S. No. 7404. See text accompanying
note 41, infra. The "Minute" form is a record of the United States and
Mexico International Boundary and Water Commission.
Minute No. 242, August 30, 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. q708.
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat.
266 (1974) (codified at U.S.C. §§ 1571 to 1599 (Supp. IV, 1974)).
INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No. 7, at 70-72; Report of the President's Special Representative for Resolution of the Colorado River Salinity Problem
with Mexico, 2 U.S. ConE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3354,
3372 (1974).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1376 (Supp. IV, 1974).
40 C.F.R. § 120.5 (1975).
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INTERIM AND PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL SALINITY
AGREEMENTS-WATER POLITICS As USUAL

The politics which have molded the development of the
Colorado River are well known and have been examined
elsewhere. 9 The lynchpins of Colorado River politics are
easily discernible: the primacy of the rural-reclamation and
tiller-of-the-land ethic;"0 protection of vested private water
rights;31 protection of future local, state, and intra- and
interbasin development potential;2 and federal assumption
of the lion's share of development costs on a nonrelational
basis to benefits bestowed-particularly as relates to irrigated
agriculture.3 To be sure, the pattern warms the heart of
29. HuNDLEY, WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE
POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (1975); Mann, supra note 17.
See also Mann, Politics in the United States and the Salinity Problem of
the Colorado River, 15 NATuRAL RESOURCES J. 113 (1975).
30. This primacy emerges clearly in Article IV of the Colorado River Compact:
(a) Inasmuch as the Colorado River has ceased to be navigable for
commerce and the reservation of its waters for navigation would
seriously limit the development of its basin, the use of its waters
for purposes of navigation shall be subservient to the uses of
such waters for domestic, agricultural, and power purposes. If
the Congress shall not consent to this paragraph, the other provisions of this compact shall nevertheless remain binding.
(b) Subject to the provisions of this compact, water of the Colorado
River System may be impounded and used for the generation of
electrical power, but such impounding and use shall be subservient
to the use and consumption of such water for agricultural and
domestic purposes and shall not interfere with or prevent use for
such dominant purposes.
Colorado River Compact (Nov. 24, 1922), art. IV (a) (b), H.R. Doc. 605,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 8-12 (1923), approved by U.S. Congress, December
21, 1928, Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 6171 (1970). See also
Mann, Politics in the United States and the Salinity Problem of the
Colorado River, supra note 29, at 114.
31. See, e.g., HUNDLEY, supra note 29, at 64-65, discussing the vesting in the
states of complete control over water distribution. See also TRELEASE,
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW [PB 203 600] 74-80 (1971).
32. This, of course, has been one of the chief concerns of the Upper Basin
since early in this century. See generally HUNDLEY, supra note 29.
83. The construction costs of multipurpose water projects are allocated to the
various purposes undertaken by the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 43
U.S.C. § 485 (1970). Water users and power producers are to reimburse
irrigation, power and municipal supply costs. However, the National
Water Commission recently estimated that irrigators are reimbursing
only 10% of the costs attributable to their water use.
A primary weakness of the Federal water resources development projects is that they have been heavily subsidized by the
Federal Government; that is, by all the taxpayers of the Nation,
to provide benefits for a few. The water users on some modern
Federal Reclamation projects, for example, repay no more than
10 percent of the construction costs attributable to irrigation,
the remaining cost being borne by the Federal Government in
three ways: by not requiring the water users to reimburse the
Treasury for the interest on the capital advanced for project
construction, by permitting power revenues and sometimes other
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a basin state politician, but it has become increasingly unsettling to economists"4 and leading water scholars." Nonetheless, these interests have been consistently adhered to in
addressing both quantitative and qualitative issues relative
to the delivery of Colorado River water to Mexico. Thus,
notwithstanding the flow of benefits nor the source of costs,
both issues have been declared national or federal obligations 8 6 -which one economist reads as "a determination [on
the part of the basin states] not to lose a single drop of
water to Mexico no matter what it might cost the general
taxpayer in the United States." 7 This pattern emerges clear-

34.

35.
36.
37.

nonirrigation revenues to be credited toward irrigation reimbursement, and by allocating an unduly large part of the costs to nonreimbursable purposes.
NATIONAL WATiR COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 128 (1973).
With respect to the salinity problem, see generally Gardner & Stewart,
supra note 8, at 67; Kneese, A Theoretical Analysis of Minute 242, 15
NATURAL REsoURcEs J. 135 (1975); Mann, Politics in the United States
and the Salinity Problem of the Colorado River, supra note 29.
NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 33.
Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1512 (1970); Colorado River
Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1595 (a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Kneese, supra note 34, at 139. This determination "not to lose a single
drop of water to Mexico" is reminiscent of early United States international
water law theory regarding the use of international rivers. In 1895,
Attorney General Judson Harmon declared with respect to the Rio Grande
River that an upper riparian nation was not accountable to the lower
riparian. He denounced any Mexican attempt to arrest development in the
United States by compelling American citizens to surrender "the use of
a provision which nature had supplied, entirely within its own territory."
HUNDLEY, upra note 19, at 23.
In 1921 and 1922 following the creation of the Colorado River Commission, Mexican officials requested representation on the Commission.
They were denied this request for the reason that only "domestic" affairs
were being discussed. As the Colorado River Compact negotiations neared
conclusion, the seven basin state commissioners, each fearful that a future
treaty with Mexico would deplete his state's share of the water, debated
the wisdom of inserting a provision allocating a possible future treaty
obligation between the two basins. They worried that such a provision
would later be deemed an admission of Mexican rights. Herbert Hoover,
the federal representative and chairman of the Commission, stated, "We
do not believe they [the Mexicans] ever had any rights." Quoted in HuNDLEY, supra note 29, at 204. The following, cautious provision was finally
agreed upon:
(c) If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of
America shall hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico
any right to the use of any waters of the Colorado River System,
such waters shall be supplied first from the waters which are
surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified
in paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove
insufficient for this purpose, then the burden of such deficiency
shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin,
and whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall
deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency
so recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d).
Colorado River Compact (Nov. 24, 1922), art. III (c), H.R. Doc. 605, 67th
Cong., 4th Sess. 8-12 (1923), approved by U.S. Congress, December 21,
1928, Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 6171 (1970).
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ly from a brief examination of both the interim and permanent solutions to the Mexican-American Colorado River
salinity dispute and from the programs being developed under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972.
Interim Measures
The period 1962-1965 saw the United States government
unilaterally taking certain temporary measures to reduce
the salinity of Colorado River water being delivered to Mexico" and negotiating with the Mexican government in an
attempt to reach a more definitive solution. These negotiations resulted in Minute 218, 8" which was a five year agreement that committed the United States to: (1) the construction of a canal that would allow the brine from the WeltonMohawk area to be bypassed around Morelos Dam, the
Mexican diversion point for the Mexicali Valley; (2) the
construction of additional wells in the Welton-Mohawk district that would allow a more controlled and selective pumping of the subterranean brine; and (3) the release of 40,000
acre-feet of additional main stem water above Mexico's 1,500,000 acre-feet entitlement under the 1944 treaty to replace
the unuseable Welton-Mohawk water that was being diverted
around Morelos Dam. These actions were taken at a cost
to the United States government of $12,000,000."0
In 1972, Minute 241"1 replaced Minute 218 and required
the continued diversion of Welton-Mohawk drainage and
substitution of such waters with additional Colorado River
water and water pumped from wells on the Yuma Mesa.
While the above actions on the part of the United States,
and the diversion past Morelos Dam by the Mexican government of additional Welton-Mohawk drainage without replacement by the United States, reduced the salinity of Colorado
River water being delivered at Morelos Dam to a level which
38. Holburt, International Problems of the Colorado River, 15 NATURAL RF,SOURCES J. 11, 15 (1975).

39. Minute No. 218, March 22, 1965, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2478, T.I.A.S. No. 6988.
40. Holburt, supra note 38, at 16.
41. Minute No. 241, July 14, 1972, [1972] 2 U.S.T. 1286, T.I.A.S. No. 7404.
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the Mexican government believed acceptable for irrigation
in the Mexicali Valley,4" such water, nonetheless, was still
significantly more saline than that being made available to
American irrigators across the border.4" Subsequent negotiations between the two governments focussed primarily upon
this issue.
A Definitive and Pernmnent Solution
For the United States, any agreement with respect to
the salinity issue was, as a matter of policy, to be "based on
dollars and not on water"4 and was to in no way jeopardize
future development of the basin.45 This policy is readily
apparent in the agreement incorporated into Minute 242,
which was concluded by the two governments in 1973.48 To
achieve the agreed-upon solution of pegging the salinity level
at Morelos Dam at a concentration not to exceed 115 parts
per million more than the concentration at Imperial Dam,"
the United States undertook major financial obligations.
Firstly, a desalination plant is to be constructed to treat
Welton-Mohawk drainage; estimated capital expenditures,
Annual
to include appurtenant works, are $98,000,000.
9
operating expenses are estimated at $10,000,000." Secondly, an additional major capital expenditure to recoup water
presently being lost to seepage is to be undertaken. While
this savings may temporarily be used to meet delivery requirements to Mexico, the water ultimately belongs to California." The cost of this project is estimated at $22,000000."' Thirdly, the United States government will provide
nonreimbursable financial assistance for rehabilitation of
42. Holburt, supra note 38, at 18.
43. The average salinity of the water diverted at Morelos Dam for the year
ending June 30, 1973, was 980 ppm, while that at Imperial Dam was
850 ppm. Id.
44. Statement of Mr. Herbert Brownell, the special negotiator appointed to
obtain an agreement with Mexico, 69 DEP'T STATu BULL. 395-96 (Sept. 24,
1974), quoted in Mann,supra note 29, at 113.
45. Id.
46. Minute No. 242, August 30, 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 7'708.
47. Minute No. 242, f l(a), August 30, 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S.
No. 7708.
48. Letter from Stanton B. Anderson and John C. Whitaker to Gerald R. Ford,
undated, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3348-53 (1974).
49. Id.
50. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1572(a) (Supp.
IV, 1974).
51. Letter, supra, note 48.
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irrigated lands in the Mexicali Valley which suffered from
the high salinity levels.2 But, perhaps most significantly,
the agreement can be taken as a commitment on the part
of the United States to maintain salinity at the level which
existed at the time agreement was reached.5
Politics as Usual
The United States' approach to the resolution of the
chaos created by the Welton-Mohawk drainage problem evidences the characteristics of Colorado River politics suggested
above.
Primacy of the rural-reclamationand tiller-of-the-land
ethic. While the very nature and technical complexity of
the salinity problem augered against accurately allocating
the costs of resolving the problem on a basin-wide basis, the
immediate cause of the dramatic increase in salinity in 1961
was readily identifiable. Basic notions of fairness probably
would preclude suggesting that the roughly 56 farms which
were responsible for the increase in salinity ought to have
absorbed the cost of the damage their drainage was inflicting
on their neighbors across the border. Nonetheless, as one
economist has suggested, "Back-of-the-envelope calculations
indicate that it would have been far cheaper to buy the necessary water rights to send pure water to the Mexicali Valley
than to implement the means actually chosen. .
,,."Approaching the question on a cost-comparison basis, another
commentator calculated that the federal government could
have purchased the offending farms themselves in from two
to nine years for what the desalination project is expected
to cost. 5 From a cost-benefit perspective, the same commentator estimated the annual cost of the agreed-upon project
over a 50-year period at $612 per acre, 6 or nearly twice the
annual gross yield per acre."7 While these analyses do not
52. Minute No. 242, 1 7, August 30, 1973, [1973] 2 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No.
7708.
53. See, e.g., Statement of Mexican Foreign Minister Rabasa, August 30, 1973,
quoted in Holburt, supra note 38, at 22.
54. Kneese, supra note 34, at 139.
55. Martin, supra note 20, at 236.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 231.
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comprehend possible indirect costs, both economic and social, "
that would have attended the alternatives suggested, they
do suggest the federal government's continued deference to
the agricultural sector.
Protection of vested private water rights. This characteristic manifests itself in several ways. As the preceding
discussion suggests, the responsible private water users were
protected against the costs their use imposed on downstream
users. That the damage would have been actionable and
resolved in favor of Mexico seems beyond serious question. 9
Furthermore, the federal government's approach in this instance suggests that users, particularly irrigators, will be
protected from governmental interference that would affect
the continuation of the particular use as it presently existsthat is, even with adequate reimbursement, the federal government evidences some reticence in moving a particular
water right to a functionally different use, which, in this
instance, would have been to a nonuse (although this admittedly would have benefitted other users, at least indirectly).
Finally, and perhaps more indirectly, the "don't lose a drop
to the Mexicans" approach suggests a disinclination to force
reductions according to the states' prior appropriation
systems.
Protection of future development potential. In that this
was a stated premise on which a negotiated settlement with
Mexico was to be pursued, it requires little elaboration. Nonetheless, it is apparent that future development, particularly
in the Upper Basin, will merely accelerate and exacerbate
the salinity problem in the lower reaches of the river." While
the Upper Basin states can undoubtedly formulate an argu58. For example, if the farms were simply purchased by the federal government, the impact on the local community could be significant. Furthermore,
there may be real value to maintaining production, even though subsidized,
in anticipation of future demands for food. Finally, consider that there
may well be institutional value in not having the federal government simply
take over all aspects of the management of the river and attending operations. See Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water to People,
States and Nation, in KURLAND, THE SUPREME COURr Ra-raw (1963).
59. See HUNDLEY, supra note 19, at 176. This was the conclusion reached by
the Washington, D.C., law firm of Chapman and Friedman, which was
retained by the government of Mexico.
60. INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No. 7, at 54-69, and Tables 18, 19, 20 at 192-95;
Report of The President's Special Representative, 8upra note 26, at 3372.
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ment that they have "vested rights" in planned development
projects, as a result of past agreements, political understandings, etc., continued development and stabilization of the
salinity problem seem, at this juncture, to be incompatible. "
Federalassumption of costs. The cost of the negotiated
solution is to be born almost exclusively by the federal taxpayer -without regard to the flow of benefits. To be sure,
resolution of the dispute with Mexico over the salinity problem was in the national interest, particularly when viewed
in the context of the international and Western hemispheric
political climate during which the problem arose. 3 Realistically speaking, the full development of the basin would
probably ultimately have led to friction with Mexico over
water quality. Nonetheless, the drainage from a local irrigation project made possible largely with federal dollars 4
created a problem which is being resolved totally with federal
dollars, and which, furthermore, is being used indirectly as
justification for massive federal expenditures to resolve the
salinity problem for the river as a whole."
Engineering Over Economics
A final observation is appropriate. The Mexican-American salinity agreement evidences the preference for engineering solutions to what are admittedly very complex questions. But engineering solutions have a tendency to be significantly more expensive than originally estimated, have
long lead times which are susceptible to repeated delay, and,
when based on new technology, tend to be sometimes less
than successful. However, the engineering approach has the
obvious advantage of avoiding what one observer refers to
61. Id. The National Commission on Water Quality concluded that "Although
concern over salinity is widespread, interest in development projects still
dominates water resource attitudes, and the institutional structure reflects
this dominance." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WATER QUALITY, STAFF DRAFT
REPORT VI-56 (Nov. 1975).

62. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 15711, 1572(b)
(Supp. IV, 1974).
63. HUNDLEY, supra note 19, at 175, 177.
64. Id. at 173; 43 U.S.C. § 613 (1970).
65. See generally FORUM PRorosED STANDApS FOR SAuNITY; Mann, Politics
in The United States and the Salinity Problem of The Colorado River,
supra note 29, at 121-28. See also Colorado River Basin Salinity Control
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1591 to 1599 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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as the "tough questions""6 and of avoiding disturbing the
delicate house of cards upon which the relative harmony of
competing interests in the Colorado River Basin has been
constructed.
SALINITY CONTROL ABOVE IMPERIAL DAMCONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AND MORE FEDERAL DOLLARS

The cost to the federal government of obtaining congressional approval of the implementing legislation necessary
to effectuate the details of the agreement reached with the
Mexican government in Minute 242 was an immediate authorization of $125,000,000 in upstream salinity control projects."
While there appears to be little question that on the American
side the negotiators of Minute 242 proceeded on the assumption that an upstream salinity control program was a certanity,68 the legislation proposed by the executive branch69
envisioned that upstream salinity would be dealt with principally under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972.0 This presumably would have facilitated a more thorough analysis of both the problem and
potential solutions prior to the undertaking of any major
programs.' The legislation proposed and supported by the
basin states was designed to protect basin interests and to
place the financial burden of present and future projects
on the general taxpayer. 2 The basin states were successful
on both counts.7
Legal Framework for Salinity Control
The institutional structure and attending legal framework which governs the allocation of Colorado River water66. Mann, supra note 17, at 168.
67. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1598(a) (Supp. IV,
1974).
68. Furnish & Ladman, supra note 18, at 104.
69. H.R. 12834, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See also Executive Communications, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nhws, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3339-53 (1974).
70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1376 (Supp. IV, 1974).
71. See generally Executive Communications, supra note 69.
72. Furnish & Ladman, supra note 18, at 102. See also H.R. 12165, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974).
73. Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (1974) (codified at U.S.C. §§ 1571 to 1599
(Supp. IV, 1N74)).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss2/5

12

Hennig and Olson: The Colorado River Salinity Problem - Old Approaches to a New Iss

1976

COMMENTS

471

the quantity issues-is not congruent with that which appears
to be developing with respect to salinity-the water quality
issues. As has been suggested elsewhere, the allocation system operates at four levels-international, interregional, inis comprised of a composite
terstate, and intrastate 7--and
of treaties, statutes, compacts, administrative regulations
and rulings, contracts and court decisions. The emerging
structure and legal framework for salinity control is presently much simpler, and, as of yet, principally federal in character. Under the Water Quality Act of 1965, the states were
required to adopt water quality standards applicable to interstate waters within their boundaries by 1967." The standards subsequently adopted by the basin states did not embrace salinity.7" The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 7" as interpreted by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), quite explicitly required that
salinity standards for the Colorado River be adopted by the
states." The basin states' response was to form the "Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum" to facilitate development of the required criteria.79 The Forum's proposals
have been released"0 and adopted by each of the seven basin
states.8 Finally, Title II of the legislation implementing
Minute 242 authorized four specific programs of salinity
control and further study of additional projects.8"
The Forum Plan
When it became clear under EPA's interpretation of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
74. Weatherford & Jacoby, impact of Energy Development on the Law of the
Colorado River, 15 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 171, 175 (1975). See also Meyers,
The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1966).
75. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5, 79 Stat. 234.
76. INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No. 7, at 3.
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. IV, 1974).
78. 40 C.F.R. § 120.5 (1975).
79. The Forum was entered into in November, 193.
80. FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY.

81. All seven basin states have adopted the FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR
SALINITY, as modified by SUPPLEMENT, INCLUDING MODIFICATIONS TO PROPOSED WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR SALINITY INCLUDING NUMERIC CRITERIA AND PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR SALINITY CONTROL, COLORADO

RIVER SYSTEM (Aug. 26, 1975). Colorado, however, is not in procedural
compliance with the federal requirements. The salinity standards proposed
by the basin states have been published in the Federal Register by EPA
for public comment. Formal approving action by EPA will commence after
public comments have been received. 41 Fed. Reg. 13656 (1976).
82. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1592, 1593 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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1972 that the basin states would be required to adopt numeric
criteria for salinity control in the Colorado River, 3 the seven
basin states formed the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum.84 The position adopted by the states at the time
of formation of the Forum was:
The appropriate objective of the [Colorado River
Salinity Control] project is the maintenance of
salinity at or below levels found in the lower main
stem as of April 1972, while the Upper Basin States
continue to develop their compact-apportioned
waters.
The seven States concur in the goal of compliance
with the adopted criteria by July 1983, with the
understanding... that the criteria will not be used
to delay or interfere with any State's development
of its compact-apportionment. . .. "I'
The Forum's proposed plan was issued in June, 1975,
and restates that such plan is predicated upon the principle
that "each of the states has the right to use the water to
which it is entitled under the 'Law of the River'."8
Full Future Development a Prerequisite
There is no evidence that planned future development
projects have been reconsidered. 7 However, it is clear that
future development will adversely and directly affect the
salinity problem. As the Upper Basin develops toward
full usage of its allocation under the 1922 Colorado River
Compact, the result will be increased salt concentrating due
to evaporation, transpiration, or incorporation into product,
and the return of the effluent by point or nonpoint discharges,
as well as increased salt loading, primarily as a result of
the irrigation of significant amounts of new land. This
development is planned even though current projections estimate that flow augmentation will be needed by 1990 to meet
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. IV, 1974); 40 C.F.R. § 120.5 (1975).
84. FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, at 3-10.

85. Statement of Position Adopted by Basin States on November 9, 1973, quoted
in FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, at D-1, D-2.
86.

FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, at 63.

87. Rather, such projects are being "reformulated" to reduce salinity.
at 82.
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the Mexican Treaty obligations." Table I summarizes current estimates of the effects of planned development projects
on both quantity and quality.
TABLE 189
ADDITIONAL DEPLETIONS 1972 TO 2000
AND
EFFECT ON SALINITY LEVELS AT IMPERIAL DAM
Year 1980
New
New
IrrigaDepletions
tions
(1000 af)
(acres)

Year 1990
New
New
IrrigaDepletions
tions
(1000 af) (acres)

Year 2000
New
New
IrrigaDepletions
tions
(acres)
(1000 af)

UPPER
BASIN

751

44,540

2,254

250,460

2,803

302,760

LOWER
BASIN

275

51,329

-61

65,775

-61

69,775

TOTAL

1,026

95,869

2,193

316,235

2,742

372,535

ESTIMATED
SALINITY AT
IMPERIAL
DAM*

963 ppm

1,182 ppm

1,250 ppm

*Salinity levels include the estimated reductions attributable to the four projects
authorized by Pub. L. No. 93-320, although funds have yet to be appropriated
for these projects; and assumes that salt loading of four tons per acre occurs
on newly irrigated lands.

Pursuant to the regulations promulgated by the EPA,9" and
as incorporated into the Forum's proposed plan,"' the goal is
to maintain the salinity level at Imperial Dam at 879 mg/1.
As Table I above illustrates, this goal will be exceeded prior
to 1980, if the planned development projects are in fact completed as scheduled, unless major salinity control programs,
in addition to the four projects previously authorized, are
implemented. This situation provides the basin states with
their principal argument for authorization of the 12 additional projects identified, but not approved, in the Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Act of 1974.92
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No.

7, at 69.

Id. This table is a composite of Tables 18, 19, 20, at 192-95.
40 C.F.R. § 120.5 (e) (2) (ii) (1975).
FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, at i.
Id. See 43 U.S.C. § 1593(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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A "back-of-the-envelope" cost-benefit analysis of the
four projects authorized in 1974 illustrates the arguably
questionable economic feasibility of such projects.
TABLE 119
ESTIMATED COSTS OF
SALINITY CONTROL PROJECTS

Capital

Paradox
Valley
Grand Valley
Basin
Crystal
Geyser
Las Vegas
Wash

COSTS
Annual
Operating

BENEFITS
Reduction in
Annual
Annual Reduction
Salinity Level
Depletion
in Costs for
of Water Downstream Users at Imperial Dam
(ppm)
(acre-feet)

$16,000,000

$350,000

5,800

$3,680,000

-16

59,000,000

None

None

4,370,000

-19

500,000

None

150

69,000

No
Estimate

No
Estimate

No
Estimate

No
Estimate

- 0.3
-13

These costs are 75 percent nonreimbursable; the reimbursable portion is to be paid out of the Upper and Lower
Basin Development Funds,94 which derive their revenues from
surplus payments from federal power projects.9" Thus, while
upstream irrigators, who are responsible for 75 percent of
the man-caused salinity, are relieved of financial responsibility for the costs they impose on downstream users, downstream irrigators, who receive 80 percent of the benefit (since

they suffer 80 percent of the damages of salinity) from improvements in the quality of water, enjoy such benefits
cost-free.
INTERIOR PROGRESS RPORT NO. q, at 73-90. Cf. the basin states' view,
FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, at 102. However, the cost of
water development projects has been consistently underestimated, and
sometimes by factors of more than two. Mann, supra note 17, at 160-61;
see also 6 ENVIRONMENT REPORTER CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1327 (1975).
In that the engineering technology involved in the salinity projects is
new and untried, one could anticipate significant cost overruns which
would, of course, weigh the cost-benefit analyses even further against the
economic feasibility of construction.
94. 43 U.S.C. § 1595 (Supp. IV, 1974).
95. 43 U.S.C. §§ 618, 620, 1543 (1970).
93.
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Federal-State Responsibilities
The Forum plan envisages the below-listed major elements:
1. Prompt construction and operation of the initial
four salinity control units authorized by Section
202, Title II of Pub. L. No. 93-320 [43 U.S.C.
§ 1592 (Supp. IV, 1974)].
2. Construction of the twelve units listed in Section
203(a) (1), Title II of Pub. L. No. 93-320 [43
U.S.C. § 1593 (Supp. IV, 1974)], or their equivalents after receipt of favorable planning reports.
3. The placing of effluent limitations, principally
under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program provided for in Section 402 of Pub. L. No. 92-500
[33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. IV, 1974)] on industrial discharges.
4. The reformulationof previously authorized, but
unconstructed, federal water projects to reduce
the salt loading effect of return flows.
The plan also contemplates the use of saline waters
for industrial purposes wherever practicable, programs by water users to cope with the river's high
salinity, improvements in irrigation systems and
management to reduce salt pickup, studies of means
to minimize salinity in municipal discharges, and
studies of future possible salinity control programs.
(emphasis added)"
The states clearly envisage federal responsibility for
all major projects, to include construction and operation of
salinity control units, while the states focus on implementation of permit systems, planning, and education." The principal responsibility which the states wish to impose on the
federal government is financial. 8
96. FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR
97. Id. at 66-92.
98. Id. at 108, 110.

SALINITY,

at 63-64.
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The Pattern Continues
The coordinated approach of the federal and basin states
governments to salinity control above Imperial Dam evidences the characteristics of Colorado River politics discussed above. 9
Primacy of the rural-reclamationand tiller-of-the-land
ethic. To the extent that estimates can be made of the use
of future depletions in the Upper Basin that will be facilitated by planned projects, the primacy of the agricultural
ethic is being eroded to some degree. Anticipated energy
and energy-related industrial development will make significant demands on Upper Basin water."' Furthermore, municipalities in the Upper Basin will continue to exert increasing
demands for water. 10 ' Nonetheless, current estimates envisage the development of 302,760 acres of new irrigated lands
by 2010, or more than double the existing irrigated lands
for the entire basin. Much of this development will be accomplished by federally funded water projects, while projects
to control the salinity impacts of these programs will also be
federally funded. The lion's share of the reimbursable costs
allocated to these projects will probably continue to be borne
by power users. Thus, to a large degree, irrigated agriculture enjoys the benefits of water use on a cost-free or at
least subsidized basis, while at the same time escaping financial responsibility for the costs it imposes.
Protection of vested private water rights. The basin
states' approach to salinity control is conditioned on federal
recognition of the "Law of the River," which includes private
rights. Presently existing rights are insulated from the true
economic costs inherent in the right and are protected functionally in the sense that new demands will be satisfied to
some degree from future developments and augmentation.
The probable result is that economically marginal uses of
water will be preserved.
99. See text accompanying notes 29 to 33, supra.

100. Weatherford & Jacoby, supra note 74, at 171-75; see also INTERIOR
REPORT No. 7, at 54-69.
101. Id.
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Protection of future development potential. The basin
states have not only attempted to protect future development,
they have in coordination with the federal government
adopted a policy of development first, quality control second.
Both the EPA regulations.. and the Forum plan... only require that control measures "be included in the plan" and
impliedly approve projects where development will precede
completion of salinity control measures." 4
Federal assumption of costs. As discussed above, the
federal government will assume the lion's share of the financial burden, while reimbursable costs will be assumed principally by power users. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that a
significant portion of the moneys required for the improvement of irrigation techniques, research, education, etc. will
directly or indirectly come from the federal treasury.
Engineering over economics. Massive engineering projects are planned to attack the natural sources of salinity.
To be sure, the engineering feasibility of some of these
projects is highly questionable-a fact admitted even by their
proponents"' 5-while the economic considerations, while being
far from simple, stand on less than firm evidence of favorable cost-benefit analyses. At the same time, technical understanding of how to cope with the principal source of mancaused salinity-irrigation-remains cloudy at best. Nonetheless, massive engineering projects to reduce naturally
occurring salinity are propounded while plans proceed to
double the irrigated lands in the basin. It is conceivable
that the taxpayer might be better off merely paying higher
food prices directly, rather than through what ultimately
amounts to a massive subsidization of irrigated agriculture. Whether or not that is the case, the question merits
examination.
102. 40 C.F.R. § 120.5 (c) (2) (iv) (1975).

103. FORUM

PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, at ii-iii.

104. See the conclusions of the National Commission on Water Quality, supra
note 61.
105. INTERIOR PROGRESS REPORT No. 7, at '3-111.
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SALINITY AND FEDERALIZATION
OF THE RIVER

As Dean Trelease observed upon reviewing Arizona v.
California,' the question is no longer one of federal authority but rather whether the federal government will exercise
such authority. While this observation was directed at the
question of quantity, it would seem even more appropriate
to issues of salinity control." 7 Given that the states view
the reduction of the salinity of water being delivered to
Mexico as a federal responsibility," 8 and that the principal
effort to cope with the problem above Imperial Dam is being
fueled by the EPA under the requirements of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,"09 it can
be argued that the absence of greater federal intrusion is
presently largely a function of the lack of any significant
articulated opposition to water politics as usual in the Colorado River Basin.
As one political observer has noted, the only significant
opposition to Colorado River politics has come from environmental interests."' The spectre of opposition to massive
federal expenditures for salinity control is at least nominally
suggested by a court challenge to an EPA exemption from
the NPDES permit system of certain agricultural lands."'
Whether such opposition, either on environmental or fiscal
grounds, will manifest itself sufficiently to spur any rethinking of future development projects or of planned salinity
control projects is entirely speculative. What is apparent,
however, is that development without salinity control will
merely rekindle the salinity problem with the Mexican government. The lower basin states may well find themselves in
an unexpected and informal coalition with the Mexicans as
Upper Basin development impacts upon them much in the
same manner as the Welton-Mohawk District impacted upon
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Trelease, aupra note 58, at 203-05.
See text accompanying note 74, supra.
See generally FORUM PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR SALINITY.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1376 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Mann, upra note 17, at 14.748; Mann, Politics in the United States and

111.

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 7 E.R.C. 1881 (1975).

the Salinity Problem of the Colorado River, supra note 29, at 119.
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the Mexicans in 1961. The potential for interbasin conflict
is manifest-and materialization of such prolonged conflict
could well provide an additional spur to increased federal
intrusion, as it did in the prolonged Arizona-California
dispute.
CONCLUSIONS

The prolonged interbasin and interstate battles over the
development and the allocation of the waters of the Colorado
River are very recent history, as is the negotiation of the
1944 Treaty allocating water to Mexico. The salinity problem has rekindled the Mexican-American dispute and although an agreement appears to have brought calm upon
the international border, it is questionable if that agreement
ought to be labeled "permanent and definitive". Just as
there remains the very real potential for future disputes at
the border over salinity, salinity could likewise rekindle a
major interbasin dispute. The success of on-going efforts
to resolve the salinity problem of the Colorado River will
be determinative of whether or not such disputes will
materialize.
This Comment has briefly surveyed the general outline
of the approaches which have been formulated to resolve the
growing salinity problem faced by both Mexican and American users of Colorado River water. The conclusions are
neither original nor surprising-it's politics as usual on the
river, and the engineers are having a greater say in the
matter than are the economists. What is new, however, is
the complexity of the problem and the vast amount of resources which will be required, first to understand it, and
second, to solve it. The federal government appears to be
leading the way.
Federal leadership and federal assumption of the lion's
share of financial responsibility very early on clearly suggest greater federal influence over the long haul. Whereas
a significant portion of the "Law of the River" with respect
to allocation and use of the waters of the Colorado River is
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976
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state law, the legal framework which appears to be emerging with respect to quality is largely federal law. In the
long term, however, it is not clear that two separate legal
frameworks can be maintained--one for allocation and use,
and one for quality. Available quantity directly affects
quality, and quality directly affects use. Thus, one can reasonably propound the proposition that salinity may well spur
further "federalization" of the Law of the River in toto.
The massive flow of federal dollars, past, present, and
anticipated, into the Colorado River Basin is in large part
a subsidization of irrigated agriculture. While this pattern
of federal spending may be justified by a variety of larger
considerations, both regional and national, these considerations are not being articulated and are thus susceptible to
attack not only by other competitors for federal dollars, but
also by other segments of the agricultural industry.
On-going and anticipated changes in the structure of
the economy of the Colorado River Basin may also have
direct and profound impacts upon issues of Colorado River
water quantity and quality. Expansion of municipal, industrial and energy-related uses of water and contraction of
the amount of water devoted to irrigated agriculture has
a direct effect on the salinity problem. Different uses can
withstand different levels of salinity and contribute to salinity
in varying degrees. Finally, different uses may well contribute to quality problems other than salinity.
Thus, this Comment not only queries the approaches
which have been formulated to address the salinity problem,
it also asks if the proper questions have been raised.
RICHARD A. HENNIG
JANICE BAUMGART OLSON
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